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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FL()HK\'<'I~
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UEOR(H~ ~I.

PAULSON, .JR.,

,\dmi11ic>trn1or of the Estate of
~1-L\ HOS ~I ITCHELL, Deceased,
ll\1T!'I1J]) PACH1 IU INSURANCE
1'0.\11'"\NY, a eorporation; FAC-

'l'OHY T\I Wl1 U.A L LIABILITY
I>J~TTHANCF~ COMP ANY OF

\

Case
No.10385

n eorporation, and
.\ lTT<l~IOBl LJ;J MUTUAL
INmil\;\NCijJ COMPANY OF
.\.\!EH l( 'A, a eorporation,

;\~IEHH';\,

Defendants and Appella1zts.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
:S'L\T~~:\H~NT

OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an aetion by plaintiff against her husband's
i!hurmwc' c·ompan~' to recO\'er $5,000 under the uninsured
nint 11rist provisions of his poliey with said company. It
im olns an interpretation of the policies of two difL·ti·nt l'ompanies.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER

cou1rr

In the trial court, plaintiff, respondent aitd 1 t' ..
· '
( e v1111
ant, appellant, each made a motion for summar
,·
'
} lll1k
ment. Plaintiff's motion for summary J·udgmei t,
.
l \\ "'
granted and defendant's denied.
Defendant appeal,
from the trial court's order and judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the summary ju<lgnwo:
granted in favor of plaintiff and for judgment in di··
f endants' favor as a matter of law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a vehirl1·
owned by Earl V. Gritton and driven by Helen j1. Uritton on April 4, 1961, when an accident occurred with :1
vehicle being driven by one Sharon Mitchell. The 1w1.·i
dent occurred in the City of Bountiful, DaYis Cou11h,
Utah.
As a result of the accident, Sharon .Mitchell 11 :1'
killed and plaintiff was injured. Sharon Mitchell 1rn'
uninsured at the time of the accident (R. 12). The Grit
ton vehicle in which plaintiff was riding was insurrd LY
United Pacific Insurance Company at the time of 1l1''
accident and the coverages included uninsured rootnri~t'
11
insurance with a limit of $5,000. Florence Russell ' ' '
2

insnred, though not a named insured, under her husi.,11111 's polil'.y with Factory Mutual Liability Insurance
( ·umpm1) uf America which policy also provided unin'llred motorist t:overage with a limit of $5,000 (R. 7).

:rn

Plnintiff filed suit against George M. Paulson, Jr.,
.u; ndmiuistrator of the estate of Sharon Mitchell, de., ;1 .·wd; U ui t(•d Pacific Insurance Company and your a ppel laut herein, alleging Sharon Mitchell to be uninsured,
to recon~r damages for her injuries and medical expenses.
The Jefen<lant, United Pacific Insurance Company, sett\('11 with the plaintiff under the uninsured motorist covprage of tl1e Gritton policy for the sum of $4,500 with1m! filing- an answer. The defendant Factory Mutual
Liability Insurance Company of America and Automoliilf' ~lutnal Insurance Company of America, which
~110nld lJe consi<iered as one under the title of Factory
\[nhrnl Liability Insurance Company of America, denied
linhilit~, nHd0r its policy on the basis that its uninsured
motorist COVL'rage was excess only to United Pacific In'111 <1n(·e Company's policy on the basis that United Paeific- lusnrmwe Company had the primary coverage and
tl1at under the terms of the other insurance provisions
,,f lhe poliey of Factory Mutual there was no coverage.
the plaintiff secured a default judgm1·1i( agninst the administrator of the uninsured motorist
1
·-otah• for thP sum of $10,000 plus medical expenses and
nn" ~('(·ks to eollect $5,000 from the defendant, Factory
\fntnal Liabilty Insurance Company under the terms of
ii:; 11ni11s11red motorist provision.
~uhseqrn~ntly

3

The two insurance policies under Other J11 , 111·a ii Cc
provisions pertaining to uninsured motorist covera!£0
provide as follows:
c

United Services Policy.
''Other Insurance - ·with respect to bodih ii!
jury to an insured while occupying a11 aut~mu
bile not owned by a named insured under thi.~ ;·n
dorsement, the insurance hereunder 1:ihall apJih
only as excess insurance over any other simila·r
insurance available to such occupant and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount h
which the applicable limit of liability of this t'J;.
dorsement exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of liability of all such other insurance.
FACTORY MUTUAL, "OTHER INSUHANCE-Witlt

11-

spect to bodily injury to an insured whil<~ occnp»ing an automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance hereunder shall apply 01tly
as excess insurance over any other similar insmance available to such occupant and this immnrnce
shall then apply only in the amount by which !lH·
applicable limit of liability of this part exceeds till'
sum of the applicable limits of all such other i11
surance." (R. 10)
United Pacific Insurance Company's policy, snhparagraph 2, Definitions, under A(2) provides that tlw
unqualified word "insured" means among other thing.'.
'' ( 2) Any other person while occupying an insurl'rl
automobile." (R. 32)
At the time of this accident, Utah's financial responsibility laws required a motorist to carry a minim 11111
policy of liability insurance in the sum of $5,000 for iii4

jur.1· or deatl1 of ouc person in any one accident and sub.i(·d to said limit for one person in the amount of $10,000
1iecn11~l' of injury or death of two or more persons in any
one nrrident. U. C. A. 1953, Section 41-12-1, subpara;;r:iph (k).

The trial court, pursuant to the motion of the plain11 tf, apparently ruled that the other insurance provisions

of tlw respective policies were repugnant to each other
:i11d rnid and granted judgment to the plaintiff for the
:;nm of $3,000 against the defendant, although there
11·erc no findings of fact made by the court or prepared
or filed in tlw case which was kept under advisement for
8pproximately two and one-half years.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE OTHER INSURANCE PROVISIONS OF
THE TWO POLICIES ARE NOT CONFLICTING OR REPUGNANT TO EACH OTHER.
TTNI'I'ED PACIFIC'S COVERAGE IS OTHER
INRURANCE AVAILABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS AND FACTORY MUTUAL'S OTHER
INSURANCE PROVISION IS BINDING UPON
THE PARTIES TO THE INSURANCE CONTRACT.
It will be noted from reading the two paragraphs
that t)u.iy are almost identical but do contain some differr·ncr'S wltieb, for the purpose of this argument, can be
rli,regarded. The application of the two provisions of
tl 11 • policy to the faets of this accident, however, are en5

tirely different. Paragraph II A(2) of the United hi
cific policy states that the definition of the worJ ··11 ,
sured" means any other person while occupying u;i
insured autonwbile. Mrs. Russell became an insurer! ui
United Pacific while occupying the Gritton Yehicle at
the time of this accident. She was an insured occup~·i 11 ~
an automobile O\vned by a named insured under thr 1•1,_
dorsement. Therefore, United Pacific's coverage 11 ,1,
in effect and the policy applied for the full amount of tJ 1,.
coverage.
·with respect to Factory Mutual 's provisions pertaining to ''Other Insurance.'' Mrs. Russell was oc.
cupying an automobile not owned by the named imnnl
and Factory Mutual 's uninsured motorists coverag-P,
therefore, in accordance with said paragraph heeam1·
excess insurance over any other uninsured motori'i
coverage available to her. United Pacific's insurance ' R'
available to her as an insured under its policy, and tlir
only question then remaining was whether or uot Far·
tory Mutual 's insurance as excess coverage would e11rn
into play. The "Other Insurance" paragraph of Fae
tory Mutual, however, further limits the application or
this policy as excess coverage by stating that the irn;:irance should apply only in the amount by which the <111
plicable limit of liability of Factory l\fotual's unin~uri·il
coverage exceeded the sum of the applicable limit of Iia
bility of all such other coverage. In view of the faet tlint
both policies were in the amount of $5,000, Factory ,\f 11 •
tual 's policy was completely inoperative as to the '1'
cident.
1

6

1

fo tlte case of Travelers Indemnity Company of
f/!lrtforl, ('mrnecficut, Appellant, vs. Mildred Nancy
W( tis, TL N. Conrt of Appeals, 4th Circuit, April 22, 1963,
,iJt) FC'd. (2) 770, an action was commenced by the liflhilit.1· insnrer for a judgment declaring that it was not
!iahle for the death of one insured and injury sustained
h m10tlier while they were passengers in an automobile
The U. S. District Court for the
1wt owned by them.
\\'rs tern District of Virginia entered a judgment adrr·rse to the insurer and it appealed. Held on appeal:

"Under the passenger's auto liability policy containing uninsured motor vehicle endorsement, but
limiting passenger's recovery for injury suffered
·while occupying an automobile not owned by them
to excess of limit under endorsement over limits
of other similar insurance available to the passeng-ers, the passenger's insurer was not liable for
the cle::ith of one passenger and injury to another
"·here the uninsured motorist coverage under the
host's policy equaled the limit under the passenger's policy even though the host's insurance was
ahsorhed by claims of others."
P::irngraph 6 of the Travelers Insurance Company
polir>· provided as follows:
With respect to bodily injnry to an insured while occupying an automobile not owned by the named insured under this
endorsement, the insurance herem1der shall apply only as excess insurance over any other simil::i r insurance available to such occupant and this
insnrance shall then apply only in the amount by
1d1ich the applicable limit of liability of this endorsement exceeds the sum of the applicable limits
of liability of all such other insurance."
'' 0THEn INSURANCE -

7

rrhis paragraph is the same as Factory., ?II ut n·1l'
.I
(
d
most word for word.
~

In answer to the plaintiff's contention that Tran\ 1•1,
Insurance Company was liable for any lntla11e<> on plai 1,.
tiff's judgment not covered by the automobile o\rn 1, 1",
policy the court said :
"This conclusion we think untenahle. Our 1· 011 .
viction is that in this situation no uninsured pro.
tection whatsoever was due from Travelers to 1h1'
\Vells. It was explicitly excluded by the OthPr h
surance condition. The condition made Fi11Plity and Casualty the primary insurer, inasmul'11
as the Wells were 'occupying an automuhil1·
(Smith's) not owned' by them. Travelers insmance then was confined to the amount by \\·liiC'lt
its policy limit exceeded that of Fidelity and ('a,.
ualty, the only other similar insura11ce. Therr \\·a,
no other 'excess' because the two polieies \\·ere
each written for the statutory limits and no mor(·
--$15,000 for one injured and $30,000 for two or
more. Hence, under the Other Insurance comlition Travelers never became answerahlP to tliP
vVells to any extent. Their sole insurance "·a~ th1·
Fidelity and Casualty policy.''
In the case of Application of Globe l1lflem11it.11 C1 11 1pany, Appellant vs. Estate of Abraham Barker, 2:i~.Y.~.
( 2) 170, decided October 20, 1964, the New York ePu it
held the excess uninsured motorist coverage did not applY
in regard to the insured driver's policy \Yhcrc thr driw 1
was driving a vehicle owned by another arnl where tlii,
insured 's policy provided that with resped to bodil!
injury to the insured while occupying an automobile Jilii
owned by the insured, the insurance woul<l apply only a'
1

8

i·\1rs ills11ra11ce and would apply only in the amount by
"J 1id1 the applieable limit of liahility exceeded the ap-

plic·;1hle limits of liability of other similar insurance, and
tlw ;1pplicahl(• limits of liability in the policies of both the
1·;1r 11\\'m•r a11<1 the driver '.Yere the same.
~'or

a tase directly in point, both as to the actual facts

;111il tl1e policy provisions invoketl, with the case before
tl1i~ 1·onrt,

see Dorothy Burcham, Avpcllant, vs. Farmers

fJ1s11ra1u·e H:rthange, loica, l\Iay 7, 1963, 121 N\.V(2) 500,

11l1i('li ap11lied the same rule as the foregoing cited case

:wd n·citetl its holding as being the majority rule.
Jn this ease plaintiff, while riding in an automobile
rJ11 m·Ll and drin~n by one Ray N avrcal, received injuries
inn rnllisiou with a car owned by one Beacom. The Bea('Olll car and the driver were uninsured. N avrcal carried
insurance '.\'ith Surety National Insurance Company
( ~lll'Pf y).
rrhis policy provided uninsured motorist COVl'l'<lg'C'.

:~:l,100.

Smdy settled its liability with the plaintiff for
Its limit for one person was $5,000.

1'hP plaintiff's father had three identical policies
11 itl1 t Ii<> cfofendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, each
11
1' whi<'h policies provided uninsured motorist coverage
11 irh a $.J,000 limit on each policy.
After settlement with
~11rd~' the plaintiff brought action against Farmers Insurance Exchange on the three policies to recover un1b· the uninsured motorist provisions of saicl policies.
l'hr drfcmlant pleaded its excess-escape clause. (This exl'l'~S-Psrape clause is the same as the one in Factory
\[ utnal 's policy quoted above.)
9

The court held in an unanimous decision tha1 Surpty\
policy
was other similar insurance available to the p1ai1,.
»,
.
tiff and that Farmers Insurance ExchanO"e
•i·a,
t'>
'
8 l11JI
liable.
The court stated that a fair construdion of the j11 _
tention as expressed in the policies is that each com]Jall'
intended to provide and the insureds intended to Luy eo 1,_
erage to the extent stated in the excess-escape clansr·
Neither policy contains a pure excess clause. Clcarl,1.
neither company intended an insured to receive rnon
than $5,000 from all sources while occupying a non-ow1M\
automobile.
The court further said it is clear the company rntended to sell less coverage and the insureds to buy les'
coverage "while occupying an automobile not owne(l ln
a named insured.'' (This case has a good discussion prrtaining to the so-called excess-escape clause.)
Plantiff 's counsel in his memorandum to the trial
court and we assume that his brief in this court will 11'
'
along the same lines, set forth legal authorities anno1111c·
ing the rule that where there are two conflicting (":('''"
insurance clauses which are irreconeilablc, the conrt>
will hold the clauses mutually repugnant to each otlwr
and pro rate the loss between the carriers. In onler fur
1111
this rule to be operative, however, it is uecessary that
paragraphs be irreconcilable or that there lJe a cw
. ted o11:
flict between such clauses and as has beeu porn
.
111
there is no conflict in this case. Therefore, the rnlc· vh , '.
.
. ·
· bl
Plnint1ft ·
tiff's counsel seeks to mvoke is mapp1ica e.
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coull:-;el in his memorandum to the trial court cited several ca:-;es upon which he relied to support his contentioll i11 this case. An examination of the cases upon which
plaiutiff 's counsel relied will show that in each of them
tliL·n~ was a definite dispute between the insurance compallies as to which policy would apply and that the actual
,a[t involved a dispute between the two insurance companies for determination as to which of the insurance
f'ompanies should have to pay the loss. In other words,
which should be declared primary and which excess. In
most of the cases plaintiff's counsel has heretofore cited,
hotli companies had written policies on the same car. In
the case before this court, the United Pacific Insurance
Co. has acknowledged that it is the primary carrier and
that it was directly liable for the loss. This is in accordance with the general rule as set forth in Appleman's
lns11rance Law and Practice, Volume 8, Section 4194, at
Page 400, where it is stated that,

"Where the owner of an automobile or truck has

a policy \vith an omnibus clause and the additional

insured also has an ownership policy which provides that it shall only constitute excess coverage
over and above any other valid, collectible insurance, the owner's insurance has the primary
liability.''

An example of cases supporting this rule is Employers
Liability Assurance Corporation vs. Firemans' Fitnd lns11rancf"'. Group, 1958, 262 Fed(2) 259, District of Colum1iia. In that case the facts were that a car belonging to
Cali Carl, Inc., was loaned to Carl Ray Kilmer to be used
:i.~ a substitute while his car was being repaired. The

11

car was involved in an accident while being drin 11 In
Kilmer. An injured person sued him and Call Carl, 1111 .
The present suit is between the two insurers. F'irern;rn,·
Fund was Kilmer 's insurer. His coverage included driiing a substitute car because of repairs with the condition that the insurance with respect to a temporary snhstitute automobile ·was excess insurance over any otlt"r
valid and collectible insurance. Employers was \'all
Carl's insurer. Its policy defined "insured" as inelurlin~
not only the named insured but also any person "·!1ilr·
using an owned auto ·with permission of the named insured. It also provided that if other valid insurance exist,
protecting the insured from liability, this policy shall be
null and void with respect to such specific hazard otherwise covered whether the insured is specificall~, namer!
in such other policy or not; provided, however, tlrnt ii'
the applicable limit of liability of this policy exceeds tl11·
applicable limit of liability of such other valid insunrnl'c,
then this policy shall apply as excess insurance agflinst
any such hazard in an amount equal to the appliefll1lv
limit of liability of this policy minus the applicable limit
of liability of such other valid insurance. Employers snrd
Firemans for a declaratory judgment to declarr Firemans' policy primary and Employers' secondary. Thr·
court held that Employers' was primary. The excP's
insurance which Firemans' provided with respect to a
substitute car was excess insurance only. ·w1wre '1
substitute car is concerned, unless damage excee1ls tlll'
dollar limit, the policy is not other valid insuranee. Quoting Zurich General Accident and Liability I11s111·a 1111
(!ornpany, Ltd. vs. Clamor, 124 Fed(2) 717.
12

la lhese cases the policy on the owned automobile
United Pacific's coverage was
11 as held to he primary.
(Ill i I!!' O\\'Jtecl ('HI' and that of Factory l\Iutual was not on
tlie ow1wcl car. Factory Mutual 's policy would not be
nl11l·r ,·ali<l insurance, because under the terms of the
polu·il's it is excess. The excess, however, is limited to
!] 11 amount by which the applicable limits of liability of
1•'11tl0r5· Mntual's policy exceeded the applicable limits
of lrnhiJity of the United Pacific policy. Inasmuch as
l1utli policies were for $5,000 coverage, there would be no
cxc·('Ss aml, therefore, no liability to Fr,ctory Mutual, and
JikL•11·i11e, Factory Mutual 's policy would not be other
1 alicl insurance.
1

The case of Air Transport Manufacturing Compan:it,
Ltrl., vs. Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, California, 1949, 204 P(2) 647, defines the phrase "other
ralicl insurance." The case states that "other valid in1rnnmcc" used in public liability policies providing that
if other rnlid insurance exists protecting the insured, the
poliry shall be void with respect to such specific hazard
otlicrwi:-;c covered, means insurance providing an unconditional coverage of loss even though limited as to
arnonnt. Factory Mutual 's policy would not qualify undl'r this d0finition. United Pacific Insurance Co. 's would
111wlify.
Plaintiff's counsel in his trial court brief relied heavily ou the case of Oregon Auto Insurance Company vs.
l'. 8. F. & G., 195 Fed(2) 958, in which case each compan~· claimed that it was not liable and that the other
\\a~ liable and the wording of the policy was such that if

13

the wording had been applied strictly neither comvmJ:
would have paid the loss of the insured. In fact, the cou;t
said,
"It is plain that if the provisions of both polieip,
were given full effect neither insurer would hL·
liable.''
The parties admitted that such a result would protlni·~
an unintended absurdity and each argued that the court
must settle upon some way of determining which policiwas primary and which secondary. The court in thnl
case found that the companies should pro rate the 108-.
The provisions of the United Pacific and the Faetor,1
Mutual policies do not in any way tend to bring out sm1i
a result as did the policies in the Oregon Auto Ins11ra11u
Conipany vs. U. S. F. & G. case. The liability is so clear
in the United Pacific policy that they have made payment
under the same without argument, nor have they songl1t
rn any way to bring in Factory :Mutual for reimbnrscment.
In view of the fact that United Pacific is not i11volved in this lawsuit this action by the plaintiff amouub
to an action to have the ''other insurance'' paragraph of
Factory Mutual declared void, but counsel has not cited
any cases in point which would hold such paragrnpb
1
against public policy or void for any other reason. :Clli'
interest of the insurers should be ascertained anc1 ef
fectuated whenever possible. Factory Mutual ha'
contracted with its insured to pay the insured up to $.5,00ll
maximum if the insured is injured through the negli
gence of an nninsnred motorist \Yhi1e the insnrr<l is rirl

14

in the owned automobile of the named insured, but
fnrther extends the coverage to say we will also apply
!lie ]J(~nefits of this coverage to you while riding in someone else's car if they don't have uninsured motorist coverage which iR applicable to you. If they do have uninsnn•r1 motorist coverage in an amount equal to the lialiility limit of our policy, we will not make any payment
to .rnn. As previously mentioned, the plaintiff has not
,.[tell any cases holding that such a provision is unlawful, arnl under the circumstances the insured and the
company arc bound by the terms of the contract of in:rnrance.
j 11 g

If the two paragraphs on ''other insurance'' were
mutually repugnant certainly United Pacific would
he the first one to say so and try to enforce a contribution from Factory Mutual. The fact that they have not
made an appearance or made any such claim certainly
indicates that the provisions of the policies are not mutually repugnant. United Pacific Insurance Company's
policy is not in issue, because they have paid off and
are not contesting the issue. The cardinal rule is that
the insured should not receive less protection than if he
were covered by only one policy. 65 Col. L. R. 319, 1965.
Slte has already received the protection which had been
rontracted for. She is not entitled to a double recovery.

15

CONCLUSION
The other insurance provision of Factory Mutn:il i.,
binding upon the insured under the facts of this ca~~.
The trial court's decision granting plaintiff a sumnrnn
judgment should be reversed and judgment enterP1l j11
favor of the defendant, Factory Mutual.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI and
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYR
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defe1ula1ds
and Appellants
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